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LESION BEYOND MOIETY; LA MOITIÉ DE QUOI,
EXACTEMENT?
RESCISSION NOT SUPPORTED BY MINERAL
SPECULATION: HARRUFF V. KING
Leona E. Scoular *
Recently, in Harruff v. King, 1 the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal considered whether sellers may seek rescission for
lesion beyond moiety when the fair market value of the land is
later estimated to be much higher on account of the speculated
value of undeveloped minerals in the land. 2 In its analysis, the
Harruff court relied on several provisions of law, including the
articles of the Civil Code that pertain to rescission of sales for
lesion beyond moiety; 3 the sections of the Mineral Code that
prohibit rescission of sales of mineral rights for lesion beyond
moiety; 4 Louisiana jurisprudence regarding, first, the evidentiary
standard required for rescission for lesion beyond moiety, 5 second,
the rights that accompany ownership of immovable property, 6 and,
finally, the “speculative nature” of minerals. 7 The analysis takes a
significantly different turn than the First Circuit used in the case of
Hornsby v. Slade, which dealt with the same general issue. 8

* J.D./D.C.L. Candidate (May, 2016) Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University. Special thanks to Prof. John Randall Trahan and
Prof. Olivier Moréteau for their guidance, support, and editing.
1. Harruff v. King, 2013-940 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/14/14), 139 So. 3d 1062.
2. Id. at 1064.
3. LA. C.C. art. 2589.
4. LA. MIN. CODE art. 17 (2000).
5. See Cascio v. Twin Cities Development, LLC, 45,634–CA (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/22/10) 48 So. 3d 341; and Dosher v. Louisiana Church of God, 71 So. 2d
868 (La. 1954).
6. Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana, 41 So. 2d 811 (La.
1949).
7. Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607 (La. 1924).
8. See Hornsby v. Slade, infra n. 41.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs in this case are the sellers, two sisters, Tammy Renea
Martin Harruff and Amy Lynn Bilodeau [hereinafter “the sisters”],
who sold their undivided interests in two tracts of land located in
Natchitoches Parish and Red River Parish, near the Haynesville
Shale, to defendants, Richard King, Kyle King, and Renee King
[hereinafter “the Kings”]. 9 A subsequent purchaser of the same
undivided interests in the same immovable property, Edgar Cason,
is also a plaintiff in this matter. 10 The first sale, to the Kings, was
executed on July 21, 2009 for the price of $175,000.00. 11 The
second sale, to Edgar Cason, was executed on November 30, 2009
for the price of $375,000.00. 12 After the second sale, plaintiffs
filed a petition seeking rescission of the first sale for lesion beyond
moiety in the Tenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of
Natchitoches. 13 The sisters presented testimony by expert
witnesses as to the fair market value of the property sold and the
trial court acknowledged that there was evidence of the value of
mineral rights in the area. 14 The trial court granted rescission for
lesion beyond moiety, finding the fair market value of the sisters’
undivided interests in the two tracts of land totaled $687,061.08. 15
Defendants appealed alleging six assignments of error. 16
Pertinent to the discussion of lesion beyond moiety are the first
three assignments of legal error and manifest error. The first
asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the valuation of
speculative gaseous minerals. 17 The second asserts that the trial
court erred by valuing the property as a mineral-producing
property rather than a recreational property, the valuation being of
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1064.
Id.
Id. at 1064-65.
Id. at 1065.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1065-66.
Id.
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a different state than the property was in at the time of the
challenged sale. 18 The third asserts that the trial court erred in
making a finding of fact regarding the valuation reports by mixing
the reports of two experts and adding a purported mineral valuation
to achieve the amalgamated value awarded. 19 The Third Circuit’s
ruling on the first assignment of error determined the second and
third assignments of error. 20
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the Tenth Judicial
District Court, that had granted rescission of a sale of land based
on lesion beyond moiety, on the grounds that lesion beyond moiety
does not apply to the speculated value of minerals in the land that
have not been accessed. 21 The court determined that the value of
undeveloped minerals is too speculative to be included in the fair
market value considered as the basis of a claim for rescission for
lesion beyond moiety. 22 The competing facts of the case were
opposing expert witness valuations of the immovable property that
was the subject of the July 21, 2009 sale to the Kings. 23 The court
reviewed whether the Tenth Judicial District Court’s decision was
legally correct or incorrect 24 and reviewed findings of fact under
the manifest error rule. 25
The Harruff court first considered Louisiana Civil Code article
2589, which provides for rescission of the sale of a corporeal
18. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1066.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1070-71.
21. Id. at 1070.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1068-69.
24. Id. at 1066 (citing Dugan v. Gen. Servs. Co., 01-511 (La. App. 3 Cir.
10/31/01) 799 So. 2d 760, 763, writ denied, 841 So. 2d 942 (La. 2002) (trial
court’s erroneous application of law eliminates trial court’s entitlement to
deference by the reviewing court)).
25. Id. at 1066 (citing Cormier v. Comeaux, 98-C-2378 (La. 1999) 748 So.
2d 1123 (setting forth a two-part test for reversing factual findings: no
reasonable factual basis for finding in record and record shows finding is
manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong)).
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immovable for lesion beyond moiety. The seller may rescind the
sale of a corporeal immovable when the price is less than one half
of the fair market value of the thing. 26 The Louisiana Supreme
Court held in Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana that
the value of an immovable includes the value of mineral interests
or rights when the mineral interest or right is sold with the
immovable. 27 The mineral rights in an immovable are included in
the bundle of rights that make up the ownership of the underlying
immovable and are therefore part of the corporeal immovable. 28 A
seller petitioning for rescission for lesion beyond moiety must
show “clear and exceedingly strong evidence” that the fair market
value of his property is more than twice the price in the challenged
sale. 29
Second, the Harruff court shifts its analysis over to mineral
rights and away from corporeal immovables. 30 The court states that
the nature of minerals is speculative 31 and this prevents the
valuation of minerals. 32 Louisiana Mineral Code article 6 provides
that the ownership of land does not include the ownership of liquid
or gaseous minerals, but only the exclusive right to explore and
develop the land for the production of minerals and to reduce them
to possession and ownership. 33 Louisiana Mineral Code article 17
prohibits rescission of a sale of a mineral right for lesion beyond
moiety. 34
The Third Circuit comes back to the plaintiffs’ failure to meet
the high evidentiary standard of “clear and exceedingly strong
evidence” as reason for reversing the lower court’s judgment for
26. LA. C.C. art. 2589.
27. Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana, 38056, 41 So. 2d 811
(La. 1949).
28. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1067.
29. Id. at 1067-68 (citing Pierce v. Roussel, 79 So.2d 567, 571 (La. 1955)).
30. Id. at 1069.
31. Id. at 1069 (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607 (La. 1924)).
32. Id. at 1069 (citing Cascio v. Twin Cities Development, LLC, 45,634-CA
(La. App. 2 Cir. 9/22/10) 48 So. 3d 341).
33. Id. at 1069.
34. Id. at 1070.
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lesion beyond moiety. 35 The estimates of the sisters’ expert witness
were based on many assumptions beginning with the assumption
that the mineral rights would ever be leased and that minerals
would ever be produced. 36 The Third Circuit determined that the
sisters’ expert witness testimony was merely “speculation laced
with hopeful thinking.” 37 The Third Circuit held that the trial court
erred in relying on the sisters’ expert witness and found that the
sisters’ real estate expert’s estimate of the value of the land,
without any consideration of the value of mineral interests, was the
best evidence of the fair market value of the land, that is
$166,400.00. 38
III. COMMENTARY
The Third Circuit in Harruff discusses provisions of the
Louisiana Mineral Code and the “speculative nature of minerals”
more than the basic evidentiary burden. 39 The discussion of the
treatment of mineral rights does not assist in resolving the issue in
the case. Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 applies to mineral
rights, which are the exclusive rights discussed in Louisiana
Mineral Code article 6 once they have been segregated from the
ownership of the underlying immovable. 40 In this case, the
plaintiffs sold the whole ownership of the immovable property
including those exclusive rights discussed in Louisiana Mineral
Code article 6. Even considering the sale of land valued primarily
35. Id. at 1069.
36. Id. at 1070.
37. Id. at 1069.
38. Id. at 1070-71.
39. Id. at 1069.
40. See also LA. MIN. CODE art. 16 (providing an illustrative list of mineral
rights and that all mineral rights are created by the landowner), and LA. MIN.
CODE art. 2 (providing that the provisions of the Mineral Code only apply when
the Mineral Code expressly or impliedly provides for a particular situation), and
LA. MIN. CODE art. 2, cmt. (explaining that the article was intended to prevent
the application of the Mineral Code to other types of controversies properly
resolved under the Civil Code because the Mineral Code was tailored to meet
the special needs of Louisiana’s mineral industries).
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on speculation that there may be minerals accessible form that land
falls within the scope of Louisiana Mineral Code article 17, this
would preclude the remedy of lesion in all such cases, defeating
the public policy concerns reflected in Louisiana Civil Code article
2589. Therefore, Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 does not apply
to this case. Further, the Third Circuit discussed jurisprudence
recognizing the “speculative nature of mineral exploration”
without any authority to connect a speculative nature with an
absolute inability to meet the evidentiary standard and in spite of
the case of Jones v. First National Bank, Ruston, Louisiana. The
trial court relied on Jones for the rule that when land and mineral
interests are sold together, the mineral interests are to be included
in the value of the immovable property. The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Jones reversed the dismissal of a petition for rescission
for lesion beyond moiety when, considering mineral interests, the
property value was increased by more than twice as much. The one
significant distinction between Jones and this case is that mineral
leases were executed between sale and the lesionary claim in
Jones, providing more evidence of value for the Jones court to
consider than was available to the Third Circuit in Harruff.
The approach taken by the Third Circuit to the lesion issue
presented in this case can be contrasted with that taken by the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in Hornsby v. Slade in
2003 on similar facts. 41 Plaintiff-appellee Hornsby sold her interest
in a tract of land to defendant-appellant Slade and later sought
rescission for lesion beyond moiety. 42 Hornsby asserted that the
fair market value of the land, which featured significant deposits of
gravel (a kind of mineral), was more than double the sale price
considering the value of the gravel. 43 The First Circuit majority
concluded, consistent with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding
41. Hornsby v. Slade, 2002 CA 2138 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/20/03) 854 So. 2d
441.
42. Id. 442.
43. Id.

HARRUFF V. KING

2015]

279

in Jones, that when the passing of mineral rights was with the sale
of the underlying immovable, the sale is subject to rescission for
lesion beyond moiety because the value of the minerals increases
the value of the land. 44 The First Circuit majority distinguished this
from the sale of segregated mineral rights, which are incorporeal
immovables, and not subject to rescission for lesion beyond
moiety. 45 The analysis of the First Circuit majority turned on
corporeality, perhaps because it considered the value of the mineral
rather than the value of the mineral right. 46 Gravel is a solid
mineral; solid minerals are an integral part of the land and
therefore corporeal movables. 47 The mineral right to gravel, when
segregated from the bundle of rights belonging to the owner of the
underlying immovable, is an incorporeal immovable and not
subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety. 48 The First Circuit
majority specifically referred to “mineral rights” as being
insusceptible of lesionary inquiry because of their speculative
nature, not the estimated fair market value of minerals in the sale
of an underlying immovable. 49 The Hornsby majority affirmed the
lower court’s judgment for rescission for lesion beyond moiety
because the sale was of a corporeal immovable and the fair market
value of the immovable was more than twice the sale price. 50
Judge McClendon dissented from the majority opinion in
Hornsby, reasoning that Louisiana Mineral Code article 17 may
apply to the sale of immovable property in cases where there are
minerals beneath the surface of the property. 51 The underlying
argument, which is perhaps not as clearly articulated as one might
have hoped, seems to be that the Mineral Code provisions apply in
this case because the disputed amount contributing to a fair market
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 445.
Id. at 445-46.
Id.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 446.
Id.
Id.
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value more than double the sale price is based on the value of
minerals or mineral rights. Judge McClendon criticizes the
majority for considering the value of gravel instead of considering
the value of the mineral right to explore, mine, and remove gravel;
and thereby stopping the analysis because the sale of mineral rights
are not subject to rescission for lesion beyond moiety. 52 Indeed,
because the minerals do not exist for the purpose of ownership
until they are extracted, 53 it may seem illogical to consider their
value in a valuation of the land containing them. Further, because
what is sold is the mineral right in the bundle of rights that
comprise ownership of the land 54 and because lesion beyond
moiety is not a ground for rescission of a sale of mineral rights, 55 it
seems to follow logically that a sale of land may not be rescinded
when the difference in value is based on the valuation of mineral
rights.
The Harruff court did not follow the approach suggested by
Judge McClendon, and with good reason. His approach requires us
to treat a contract of one type as though it were really a different
type of contract. Judge McClendon is essentially proposing that,
under certain circumstances, we treat a deal that is structured as a
sale of immovable property as though it were a sale of a segregated
mineral right. 56 There is no sound legal basis for treating one
conventional obligation as though it were some other conventional
obligation, save, perhaps, where the obligation is simulated. It is a
settled principle that even when a conventional obligation purports
to be something other than the type of conventional obligation it
really is, a simulation, the obligation must be treated as it really is
between the parties. 57 But in Hornsby, as in Harruff, there was no
52. Id. at 447-48.
53. Id. at 447, citing United States v. 43.42 Acres of Land, 520 F.Supp.
1042, 1045 (W.D.La. 1981).
54. Jones, 41 So. 2d at 813 citing La. C.C. art. 505.
55. LA. MIN. CODE art. 17.
56. Hornsby, 854 So. 2d at 447-48.
57. See LA. C.C. arts. 2026-2027.
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simulation: the parties did not really intend to transfer just a
mineral interest on the land in question; rather, they intended to
transfer the entire ownership of that land. Unfortunately, the Third
Circuit likewise muddled the distinction between valuation of
minerals as part of the value of immovable property and the value
and sale of a mineral right.
Nor did the Harruff court follow the approach suggested by the
Hornsby majority. The Harruff court examined the mineral value
as though it were the value of a mineral right segregated by the
owner of the underlying immovable. The court need not seek to
extend the limitation to only corporeal immovables of lesion
beyond moiety to exclude mineral values in all cases because the
evidentiary standard is high enough to prevent rampant lesionary
claims that may be lacking in merit. Further, the case may arise
wherein the value of undeveloped minerals in immovable property
can be shown with clear and exceedingly strong evidence, but in
the Third Circuit, that case will now have to challenge the
precedence set by Harruff.
The Harruff court could have used the same analysis as the
Hornsby court and determined that lesionary inquiry is appropriate,
but the court still could have held that rescission is not appropriate
in this case. Considering the high evidentiary standard, requiring
“clear and exceedingly strong evidence,” 58 and the court’s
determination that the sisters’ expert witness testimony was merely
“speculation laced with hopeful thinking,” 59 it was not necessary
for the court to discuss the “speculative nature of minerals” as a
general principal that would apply to any case of undeveloped
minerals. 60 The evidentiary standard was simply not met in this
case, 61 but this should not preclude all future sellers from proving
58. Harruff, 139 So. 3d at 1067 (quoting Pierce v. Roussel, 79 So.2d 567,
571 (La. 1955)).
59. Id. at 1069.
60. Id. at 1070.
61. Id. at 1069-70.
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by clear and exceedingly strong evidence the fair market value of
undeveloped minerals in immovable property they have sold.

